By Stuart Pethick

Pethick investigates a far missed philosophical connection among of the main arguable figures within the historical past of philosophy: Spinoza and Nietzsche. via studying the the most important position that affectivity performs of their philosophies, this booklet claims that the 2 philosophers proportion the typical objective of constructing wisdom the main strong impact.

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Extra info for Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche: Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect

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A distinct idea is a semantically discrete idea. It provides evident information on the properties of its object and leaves no room for doubting what does and does not belong to it’. 46). 26 Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche judgement to see what is wrong with it, but rather to try to understand the vivacity of the perception and how it is possible to be clear about anything at all. The fact that an atheist can be ‘clearly aware that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles’ is something I do not dispute.

24 Mason (2004; 2007) makes a strong case here for Spinoza’s rejection of belief as the starting point for thinking and in this sense inaugurates a radical departure from Descartes. 25 An account of this kind is offered by Gatens and Lloyd (1994: 4), who claim that in Spinoza the imagination can actually act as a corrective for some deficiencies in reason. P15S5. 22 Spinoza: Discovering What the Body Can Do 31 and a mental grasp of virtuality proper to thinking (intellect). 27 However, as a corporeal body, the imagination cannot be dispensed with in favour of the intellect, and in fact the latter could be seen as a kind of augmentation of the former from within, rather than as an external replacement.

54 This demonstration is rather convoluted however, and Spinoza himself admits that it will cause the reader some difficulties. 60 Despite the qualitatively unique form of affection that thinking involves, Spinoza is quite clear that there would be no thinking without a body, for we could not even imagine such a thing (even if we could, then this image would only exist insofar as it relates to a living body imagining it). Much rests, therefore, on what Spinoza means by a body. He cannot posit any positive entity that exists outside of the manner in which it is experienced within the imagination (an ‘I’ with certain beliefs about things that lie outside it), because the transience of the affective-imagination means that there can be no suggestion of a ‘dominion within a dominion’;61 that is, of a singular body or existing thing that remains unaffected by everything else.

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